Chrome Wallet Trap: How a Top-Ranked Extension Stole Seed Phrase
When we install a browser wallet, we tend to trust the rankings, the reviews, and the polite “Add to Chrome” button. Through the “Safety: Ethereum Wallet” Chrome extension, that trust was weaponized. Instead, a top rank, polished wallet was itself a seed-phrase vacuum, quietly exfiltrating users’ keys through clever on-chain tricks on the Sui network.
The Trap Hiding In Plain Sight, For several days in November, Safety sat near the top of Chrome Web Store search results for “Ethereum wallet,” alongside well-known brands familiar to most of us. It appeared clean, updated, and “secure” enough for many people to put it on autopilot presuming top placement meant legitimacy.
A Wallet That Never Wanted To Grow Into a Wallet, Legitimate wallets are made to safeguard seed phrases because Safety was constructed for harvest. Beneath its minimalist interface and boilerplate marketing copy stood an attack that was carefully built, set in motion from the very beginning intended to scoop recovery phrases and empty wallets without making an obvious sound of alarm.
Scaling The Chrome Rankings With Fake Trust, Instead of pretending it was MetaMask or another major brand, Safety created its own identity, then inflated its online persona through fake reviews and involvement to compete on Chrome Web Store rankings. To an average user, it seemed like a new and up-and-coming solution: generic name and polished icon, “security” buzzwords, and nothing that screamed scam.
Why the Listing Was So Ordinary, The extension’s web page included no red flags. The copy was coherent, the branding stayed consistent, and the support link pushed into a website that hadn’t yet been blacklisted by security trackers. Permissions appeared standard for a browser wallet, and there were no “strange redirects” or pop-ups that you’d typically find suspicious.
Seed Phrase Heist On The Sui Blockchain, This real attack started the instant a user imported or created a wallet. Rather than storing the seed phrase itself, Safety silently chopped it into bits and wrote what appeared to be random wallet addresses as part of those fragments. So it sent tiny SUI transactions essentially dust to those addresses on the Sui blockchain, transforming the chain straight into a data channel that was barely there.
Micro-Transactions As Hidden Backchannel, Due to the attacker taking control of the sending wallet, they could then inspect the Sui chain and decode the bizarre destination addresses, reconstruct the original seed phrase, and, when the victim requested it, extract the victim’s money. No shady API calls, no strange domains—only regular looking on-chain activity that blends into the background noise of the banal crypto traffic.